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NOTE
CIVIL RIGHTS - The Law of Constitutional Tort - DeShaney v. Win-
nebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
Title forty-two of the United States Code provides a civil remedy for
any person who is deprived of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution. An action may be brought under Section 1983 of that
Title against every person who, acting under color of state law, subjects
another within the jurisdiction of the United States to such a deprivation.1
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services2 tested the
reach of this statute in the context of a fourteenth amendment due process
challenge. 3 In an emotionally-charged decision,4 a divided United States
Supreme Court5 refused to extend liability under Section 1983 to a munici-
pality or its agents for failure to provide protective services to a victim upon
suspicion of child abuse.6 "[N]othing in the due process clause itself, the
Court concluded, requires the state to protect the life, liberty, and property
of its citizens against invasion by private actors."7
This Note contains a brief synopsis of the facts of DeShaney and traces
the background against which the case was decided. A summary of the
1. Originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the relevant text of the statute
reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) [hereinafter § 1983].
2. 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
3. The due process clause provides: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
State action may be challenged through either the substantive or procedural components of the
due process clause, or through one of the rights incorporated as against the states by the four-
teenth amendment.
4. See generally 489 U.S. at 203-13 (dissenting opinions).
5. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices White, Ste-
vens, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun dissented.
6. Although a state tort action may have been maintained against the department for breach
of its duty of care, this case was brought under the fourteenth amendment in order to extend the
parameters of "constitutional tort" liability and to avoid the $50,000.00 recovery ceiling imposed
on claims against government agencies in Wisconsin. See Wis. STAT. § 893.80(3) (1983).
7. 489 U.S. 189 at 195.
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majority and dissenting opinions is followed by an analysis of three alterna-
tive standards which the Court could have employed. The Note concludes
with an assessment of the decision and a brief comment concerning its im-
pact on due process law.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioner brought this action on behalf of her son, Joshua
DeShaney, who suffered severe brain damage and retardation as a result of
continual abuse by his father.' The complaint alleged that the Winnebago
County Department of Social Services [hereinafter DSS] deprived Joshua of
his liberty without due process of law by failing to adequately protect him.9
Born into a dysfunctional family, Joshua became an early victim of
child abuse. I0 In 1983, officials at DSS obtained a court order placing
Joshua in the temporary custody of a local hospital, upon the information
of a treating physician who suspected child abuse." A "child protection
team"" was assembled three days later. The team decided there was insuf-
8. Upon the last instance of child abuse, Joshua fell into a coma. Emergency surgery revealed
a series of hemorrhages caused by traumatic injuries to the head inflicted over a long period of
time. As a result of the beatings and surgical procedures, Joshua lost significant portions of his
brain and is expected to spend the rest of his life confined to an institution for the profoundly
retarded. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1989).
Along with the physical effects of the beatings, Joshua will carry within him deep psychologi-
cal scars from parental rejection that will adversely affect any developmental progress he might
make during his remaining years. See Jones, Characteristics and Needs of Abused and Neglected
Children, in SOCIAL WORK WITH ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN 79 (K. Faller ed. 1981).
9. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that petitioners might proceed on two
alternative theories of liability under the fourteenth amendment. Viewed as a "liberty" interest,
Joshua might have been deprived either of his right to bodily integrity or of his right to protective
services by the Department of Social Services. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social
Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
10. Joshua's natural parents divorced the year after he was born. His father was awarded
custody and remarried. This marriage failed the following year, at which time his father's second
wife complained to police that his father "'hit the boy causing marks and [was] a prime case for
child abuse.'" 489 U.S. 189 at 192 (quoting Brief for Appellant, at 152-53).
11. Id. at 192. Wisconsin's Children's Code requires any health care worker or law enforce-
ment officer "having reasonable cause to suspect that a child seen in the course of professional
duties has been abused or neglected.., has been threatened with abuse or neglect and that abuse
or neglect of the child will occur shall report.. ." to the county department of social services "the
facts and circumstances contributing to [such] a suspicion. ... Wis. STAT. § 48.981(2)-(3)
(1987-88).
Jurisdiction of the court over children alleged to be in need of protection is provided in the
Childrens Code by Wis. STAT. § 48.13 (1987-88). Wis. STAT. § 48.207(3) (1987-88) allows the
child to be placed in the temporary custody of a hospital if the need arises under § 48.981, the
special section dealing with abused or neglected children.
12. This ad hoe committee consisted of a pediatrician, a psychologist, a police detective, the
county's lawyer, several DSS caseworkers and various hospital personnel. 489 U.S. at 192.
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ficient evidence 3 to continue to hold Joshua in the protective custody of the
state. 14 After recommending several remedial measures, 5 the juvenile
court returned Joshua to his father's custody16 and appointed a caseworker
to monitor the family situation.
One month after the first accident, Joshua was readmitted to the emer-
gency room with suspicious injuries. 7 After release on the caseworker's
recommendation, Joshua returned home only to be readmitted six months
later with similar injuries. 8 No further action was taken to protect Joshua.
Ann Kemmeter, the DSS caseworker, noted marks and visible bruises on
Joshua's head each time she visited." On March 7, 1984, she returned to
the home and was informed without explanation that Joshua had fainted.20
The next day, Joshua was beaten so severely that he lapsed into a life-
threatening coma. As a result of the beatings, Joshua will spend the rest of
his life in an immediate care facility for the profoundly retarded.2'
The district court dismissed the case upon the defendant's motion for
summary judgment.22 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning
that the state had not proximately contributed to Joshua's abuse and, there-
fore, did not deprive him of his right to bodily integrity.23 In addition, the
appellate court rejected the notion that a special relationship arises between
a state and a victim once the state is put on notice that abusive conditions
may exist.24 The idea of special relationship had been embraced by the
13. Id. In order to continue detention, the team would have had to determine that there was
probable cause to believe that if the child was not held, he or she would be subject to injury by
others. Wis. STAT. § 48.205(l)(a) (1983).
14. Parental rights have been accorded constitutional status by the Supreme Court. See
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (burden of proof to terminate parental rights is the clear
and convincing standard); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (state may voluntarily place child
in an institution at the parent's request with only minimal proceedings and without representation
for the child in such proceedings); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (right of Amish
parents to educate child at home after the eighth grade); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)
(all parents, including unwed fathers, have a right to due process before their child is removed
from their custody).
15. These recommendations included enrolling Joshua in the Headstart program, providing
his father with counseling, and encouraging his father's new girlfriend to move out of the house.
812 F.2d at 300.
16. An informal disposition embodying the terms of these recommendations was entered into
with the child's father, as permitted by Wis. STAT. § 48.245 (1983). 812 F.2d at 300.
17. 489 U.S. at 192.
18. Id. at 192-93.
19. Id. at 193.
20. 812 F.2d at 300.
21. See Jones supra note 8.
22. 489 U.S. at 193.




Third and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeal.2 5 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari26 in part to resolve this conflict and in part to define the scope of
the state's duties in a social service setting.27




Section 1983 was originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act
of 187128 to provide access to the federal courts for those deprived of
constitutionally-protected rights by state actors.2 9 While a broad remedy
may have been intended by the drafters,3" restrictive interpretations31
limited the scope of its effect.32 With the decision in Monroe v.
25. See Estate of Bailey ex rel. Oare v. County of New York, stating that "[w]hen the agency
knows that a child has been beaten, this strengthens the argument that some sort of special rela-
tionship had been established." 768 F.2d 503, 510-11 (3d Cir. 1985) (citation omitted); Jensen v.
Conrad, 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984) (acknowledging in dicta the existence of special relation-
ships under the fourteenth amendment and listing factors to be included in determining whether
such a relationship was established in a particular case); Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1983)
(holding that a duty on the part of the state could arise out of special custodial or other
relationships).
26. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 485 U.S. 958 (1988) (table
decision).
27. 489 U.S. at 194.
28. Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
29. Enacted during the Reconstruction era, the statute provided a means to enforce the guar-
antees of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments in states where official policy and established
practice dictated otherwise. See Developments in the Law - Section 1983 and Federalism, 90
HARV. L. REv. 1133, 1153-75 (1977). For a thorough study of the Act's legislative history, see
Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665-94 (1978).
30. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Recon-
struction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 938 (1986) (evidence and analysis presented in this Article
support the conclusion that the Framers and contemporaries of the Reconstruction civil rights
amendments and statutes interpreted them expansively); see generally Cong. Globe, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess. 236 (1871).
31. See, eg., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (interpreting the privi-
leges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment to protect only rights of federal citizen-
ship). See also Note, The Supreme Court Continues Its Journey Down the Ever Narrowing Paths of
Section 1983 and the Due Process Clause: An Analysis of Parratt v. Taylor, 10 PEPPERDINE L.
REv. 579, 583-86 (1983).
32. From the time of its enactment until 1961, few actions were brought under the Civil
Rights Act and these were generally limited to voting rights violations. See Note, Municipal
Liability for Negligence Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 16 STETSON L. REV. 851, 855 (1987); see also
Developments in Law, supra note 29, at 1161. The statute still does not extend to actions against
federal officials. Instead, the Court created a separate remedy "inherent in the Constitution" to
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Pape,33 and the advent of the "constitutional tort,"34 Section 1983
was given renewed viability.35 In Monroe, the Court held that state
and federal remedies were available concurrently,36 expanded Section
1983's reach, abrogated the doctrine of absolute immunity,37 and
imposed liability upon municipalities" and their policy
redress these grievances. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recovery of monetary damages allowed under the fourth amendment even in
the absence of congressional directive).
33. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
34. Two competing conceptions of § 1983 have dominated its judicial interpretation. Histori-
cally, § 1983 may be seen as limited to the confines of racial discrimination, which it was intended
to redress. Yet by its language, § 1983 may also be read as the general federal remedy for viola-
tions of all constitutional rights. See Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Em-
pirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 484-87 (1982). The latter construction has been adhered
to in recent years. The term "constitutional tort" is credited to Professor Marshall Shapo:
It thus appears that what is developing is a kind of "constitutional tort." It is not quite a
private tort, yet contains tort elements; it is not "constitutional law," but employs a consti-
tutional test. Because of this interesting amalgam, serious questions arise about the mea-
surement of the substantive right. It may well be argued that given the broad language of
Monroe construing the already broad language of the statute, every policeman's tort and
every denial of a license by a state or local board will give rise to an action under Section
1983.
Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 277,
323-24 (1965).
35. "One hardly can read about section 1983 without seeing a reference to the overwhelming
number of section 1983 cases." Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 522.
36. Monroe opened the door to a wide variety of constitutional torts. The court found that a
claim could be stated under § 1983 against government officials who violated a citizen's constitu-
tional right even though they were not acting under the sanction of "color" of state law. 365 U.S.
at 184. This expansion had been foreshadowed by the decisions in United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299 (1941) (misuse of power made possible by authority of the state is action under color of
law) and Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (acts of officers who undertake to perform
their official duties are included whether they adhere to the line of their authority or overstep it).
More important, the Monroe court held that redress through the federal court system was "sup-
plementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the
federal one is invoked." 365 U.S. at 183.
37. This had been the position of the Monroe court. Limited immunity, conferred by statute,
is still available to a number of government officials. See Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 335
(1983) (witnesses); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (judges); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-29 (1976) (prosecutors); Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1302
(9th Cir.) (parole officers), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981). It is the nature of the governmental
function which provides this immunity and not merely the title of the official. Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478, 511 (1978). Absolute immunity, however, continues to be refuted. See, e.g., Malley
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986).
38. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 (overruling Monroe insofar as it provided absolute immunity
for municipalities). In Monell, employees were allowed to recover against a municipality for con-
stitutional deprivations resulting from the exercise of a government policy or custom. Id. at 690-
91. However, municipalities were not held vicariously liable for the acts of their agents under a
doctrine of respondeat superior, where the municipality itself had not caused the violation. Id. at
690-91, 94.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:513
makers.39
2. Requirement of State Action
In order to assert a cause of action under Section 1983, plaintiffs must
allege conduct committed under color of state law, which deprives the
plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States.4°
Section 1983 claims, brought through the fourteenth amendment, are to
be enforced against governmental entities and their agents, 41not against in-
dividuals acting in their private capacity.4 2 "Careful adherence to the 'state
action' requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the
reach of federal law and federal judicial power.",43 Unconstitutional state
39. While the issue of municipal liability still turns upon the issue of causation, the Court in
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), held that "municipal liability may be imposed
for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances." Id. at 480.
But see Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985) (reaffirming the decision not to impose
liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior and refusing to find the existence of a city policy
based upon the isolated misconduct of a single police officer). See generally Note, Under the Civil
Rights Act, Municipal Liability May Be Imposed For a Single Decision by Municipal Policymakers
Under Appropriate Circumstances, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 465 (1987).
Government actors may be sued generally under § 1983 in either their individual or official
capacities. If sued individually, the Tuttle doctrine applies. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159 (1985); Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1985).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), See also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), rev'd in
part, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
41. This is actually a strange result since direct suit against a state in federal court is barred
by the eleventh amendment, unless the immunity is waived. See Grotta v. Rhode Island, 781 F.2d
343 (Ist Cir. 1986). Cf Spurrell v. Bloch, 40 Wash. App. 854, 701 P.2d 529 (1985) (Department
of Social and Health Services not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983). Although municipal-
ities traditionally were not considered "persons" for purposes of the Civil Rights Act, see City of
Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973), a line of cases beginning with Monell v. New York City
Dep't. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), reversed this doctrine. See supra notes 38-40 and
accompanying text.
The federal government may not be implicated by the statute, however, as its actions are
governed by the Bivens doctrine. See Note supra note 32.
42. See Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 719 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882
(1986).
Private action may be attributed to the state only when the private ends were accomplished
with the overt and significant assistance of state officials. See Tulsa Professional Collection Servs.,
Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486, (1988); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966) (state
liable where private individual was a willful participant in a joint activity with the state or its
agents); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (where symbiotic rela-
tionship exists between individual and the state, the state may be liable for the individual's
actions).
43. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982).
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action is not equivalent, however, to tortious conduct under state law. 4 As
the Court in Snowden v. Hughes45counsels, "state action, even though ille-
gal under state law, can be no more and no less constitutional under the
fourteenth amendment than if it were sanctioned by the state legislature."46
Therefore, the mere violation of a state statute by a government agency
does not infringe upon the Constitution.47
3. State-of-Mind Requirement
Despite the general consensus that requisite state action may not be es-
tablished by the simple violation of state statutes, courts continue to strug-
gle over which, if any, state-of-mind is required to impose liability under
Section 1983.48 Clearly, intentional acts of deprivation are sufficient to in-
yoke the principles of liability.49 Police misconduct provides the most com-
mon example of this form of constitutional violation.50 On the other side of
the spectrum, mere negligence is insufficient to support a constitutional tort
claim.51 The murky area of culpability that lies between these parameters
44. See Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926); Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S.
430, 439 (1904).
45. 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
46. Id. at 11.
47. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979). "Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of
rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law."
Id. at 146. See Snowden, 321 U.S. at 11.
48. "Neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of section 1983 contain any
indication that a defendant must act with a particular state of mind before being subject to liability
under the Act." Note, supra note 31, at 584.
49. Early cases even required intentional conduct. See, eg., Cobb v. City of Malden, 202
F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1953) (liability would only exist when defendants subjectively realized conduct
would result in depriving the plaintiff of a secured right). Today, intentional conduct is sufficient
but not necessary. See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-80 (1979); DeWitt
v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682, 685-86 (9th Cir. 1966) (not necessary to allege a purpose to deprive plaintiff
of any federal rights to state a due process claim under § 1983).
50. See Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984) (racially-motivated homi-
cide by police officer); Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1980) (police officer may be person-
ally liable for damages under § 1983); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.) (unjustified
attack on suspect by police), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973); Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536
(10th Cir. 1963) (police subject to liability for actual deprivations of liberty); Lewis v. Brautigam,
227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955) (police exacting of confessions by use of force).
51. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). "[T]he Due Process Clause is simply not
implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty or
property." Id. at 328 (emphasis in original). See also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48
(1986) (companion case holding that simple lack of care by prison officials did not trigger due
process protections).
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has been the subject of much debate and criticism in Section 1983
jurisprudence.5 2
In Parratt v. Taylor,13 the Supreme Court announced that "[s]ection
1983, unlike its criminal counterpart... has never been found by this Court
to contain a state-of-mind requirement." 54 Despite this clarification, the
federal courts continued to reach different conclusions, distinguishing Par-
ratt as limited to property interests 5 or applicable only to procedural due
process claims.56 In response, the Supreme Court addressed the issue a sec-
ond time in Daniels v. Williams,57ruling that mere negligence could not sup-
port a due process violation.58 The requirement now appears to be
somewhat greater than gross negligence,59 but somewhat less than intent,6°a
standard sometimes articulated as "conscious," 61 "reckless" 62 or "deliber-
ate"63 indifference.
52. See Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988). "A line that cannot be
policed is not a line worth drawing in constitutional law." Id. at 1219. Love v. King, 784 F.2d
708, 713 (5th Cir. 1986) (terms applicable to common law torts can be misleading in defining
constitutional abuse of power). See also Comment, Section 1983 and the Due Process Clause:
Crossing the Constitutional Line, 10 CARDOZO L. Rav. 789 (1989).
53. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
54. Id. at 534. Monroe had also purported to reach this conclusion: "Section [1983] should
be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural
consequences of his actions." 365 U.S. at 187.
55. See, e.g., Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436 (1lth Cir. 1985).
56. See, e.g., McClary v. O'Hare, 786 F.2d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1986); Wilson v. Beebe, 743 F.2d
342 (6th Cir. 1984). See generally Note, Parratt v. Taylor: Limitations on the Parratt Analysis in
Section 1983 Actions, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1388 (1984).
57. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
58. See supra note 51.
59. See Archie, 847 F.2d at 1219-20. "The distinction between negligence and gross negli-
gence does not respond to the functions of the due process clause." Id. at 1220.
60. See supra note 49.
61. Estate of Conners by Meredith v. O'Connor, 846 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 1988) (appli-
cable Youngberg standard is equivalent to that required for a finding of conscious indifference).
62. Nishiyama v. Dickson County, Tenn., 814 F.2d 277, 283 (6th Cir. 1987) (reckless indiffer-
ence to risk posed by allowing inmate to drive sheriff's car while unsupervised sufficient to estab-
lish a violation of substantive due process under § 1983).
63. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319-21 (1986) (deliberate indifference standard not
appropriate in prison context where other considerations required balancing test between inflic-
tion of pain and good faith efforts to maintain and restore discipline). Deliberate indifference
standard is appropriate in determining questions of prisoner well-being. Id. at 320 (citing Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
Since the decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989), the court decided City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). The principle issue for
decision in that case was whether a municipality may be liable under U.S.C. § 1983 for constitu-
tional violations resulting from its failure to train municipal employees. Resolving this issue, the
court held that the inadequacy of police training may serve as a basis for § 1983 liability only
where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom
the police come into contact. Id. at 1204. Similarly, in Dorman v. District of Columbia, 888 F.2d
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4. Deprivation of Rights Requirement
Finally, Section 1983 requires that the plaintiff be deprived of some con-
stitutionally-protected interest. These interests are generally shielded from
intrusive state action" through the fourteenth amendment." The due pro-
cess clause has been the most useful vehicle for enforcing both substantive
and procedural guaranties. 6 Courts have differed, however, as to what
constitutes a "deprivation" within the meaning of the statute.67 Actionable
claims have been brought where the state actively interfered with the exer-
cise of a right, or unfairly withheld the privilege to which an individual was
entitled.68 Claims have been disallowed where there existed a mere expecta-
tion of state action69 or where the state had no duty to act.7"
159 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the court found that in order to impose liability upon municipalities under
§ 1983, the plaintiff must prove deliberate indifference in municipal policy as well as a close causal
nexus with the injury. Id. at 164-65.
64. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 287 (1913) (abuse of govern-
mental power is the central inquiry under the fourteenth amendment).
65. The due process, equal protection, and privileges and immunities clauses serve to ensure a
degree of fundamental fairness throughout the fifty states.
66. Three types of constitutional protection are encompassed by the due process clause: (1)
functional due process, which selectively incorporates the protections of the Bill of Rights as
against the states; (2) substantive due process, which protects nontextual but nonetheless funda-
mental rights; and (3) procedural due process, which ensures fairness in the implementation of
government policy. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 337 (Stevens, J., concurring).
67. "A 'deprivation' connotes an intentional act denying something to someone, or, at the
very least, a deliberate decision not to act to prevent a loss. The most reasonable interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment would limit due process claims to such active deprivations." Parratt,
451 U.S. at 548 (Powell, ., concurring). Compare DiMarzo v. Cahill, 575 F.2d 15 (1st Cir.), cerL
denied, 439 U.S. 927 (1978). "[T]he Civil Rights Acts of 1871 were intended to safeguard consti-
tutional rights which state authorities might deny by neglecting to enforce state statutes as well as
by more affirmative action. Failure to act where there is a duty to act can give rise to an actiona-
ble claim under section 1983." Id. at 18 n.3 (citation omitted) (containing a much clearer state-
ment on actionable inaction).
68. "When the state puts a person in danger, the Due Process Clause requires the state to
protect him . . . . When a state cuts off sources of private aid, it must provide replacement
protection." Archie, 847 F.2d at 1223. See also Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir.
1982) (if government hurls a person into a snake pit, it may not disclaim responsibility).
69. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 467 (1981) (mere expectancy
based on high probability of state action not enough to create an entitlement); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (an abstract need or desire does not create a property interest).
70. See, eg., Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882
(1986). "Nothing in the fourteenth amendment or its history... suggests that it was written to
provide an expansive guarantee of state protective services." Id. at 720.
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B. Due Process
1. Generally
The due process clauses protect an individual's life, liberty, and prop-
erty interests from the arbitrary exercise of power by the state.7 Substan-
tive due process protects those interests which the Court has deemed
"fundamental,"72 although they are not explicitly enumerated in the text of
the Constitution.73 When these interests are created by an independent
source, such as state law, they are protected by procedural due process con-
cerns,74 as long as there is a legitimate claim of entitlement to their bene-
fit.75 Procedural due process guarantees individuals pre-deprivation notice
and a hearing when the state seeks to infringe upon their rights. However,
resort may also be limited to post-deprivation remedies provided under
state law.76
2. Substantive Due Process
The Bill of Rights is essentially a charter of negative liberties.77 Where
the Constitution recognizes no duty on the part of the state to act,75 the
government's failure to so act cannot support a substantive due process
claim.79  Furthermore, not all privileges granted by the government are
71. See Weimer v. Amen, 870 F.2d 1400, 1405 (8th Cir. 1989).
72. See Wells & Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA.
L. REv. 201 (1984).
73. Examples of such created interests are found in: Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)
(right to marry); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (right of privacy); Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651 (1977) (bodily integrity).
74. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
75. Once state law entitlements have been identified, the Court does not enforce the state law
giving rise to those entitlements, but rather tests against the Federal Constitution the procedures
by which the state deprives a person of those entitlements. See Archie, 847 F.2d at 1217; see also
Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
76. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 538. This is particularly true when the deprivation is not a result
of some established state procedure and the state cannot adequately predict when the loss will
occur. Id. at 541.
77. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983).
78. Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443, 1446 (7th Cir. 1984).
79. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (no duty to provide substantive services to
those within its border); Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1986) (state not required to
provide safe working conditions or protect employees from murderers); Ellsworth v. City of Ra-
cine, 774 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1985) (city had no duty to provide body guards to endangered wife of
police detective); Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443 (7th Cir. 1984) (no duty to provide firefighters);
Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983) (no duty of police to rescue burning
victim).
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guaranteed by the Constitution.80 The contemporary Court views each new
claim to a substantive due process right with caution.81 Yet, although
scholars disagree over their propriety, the Court has sketched the contours
of several of these "fundamental interests."
From Joshua's perspective, the freedom from unjustified intrusion on
personal security, as recognized in Ingraham v. Wright, 2 is one of the most
significant of these historic liberties. Accordingly, due process violations
may occur when officials withhold medical assistance from someone within
their custody, 3 or when they abandon minors after having placed them in a
position of peril."4 There need not be a violent action to allege a deprivation
of rights.8 5
3. Procedural Due Process
Liberty and property interests may attain constitutional status by virtue
of their recognition and protection by state law.8 6 Due process does not
ensure, however, that state officials must comply with state-established pro-
cedures. 7 Nor does the existence of a fundamental right guarantee a citi-
zen the ability to exercise that right.8 8 Yet, once state law entitles its
citizens to certain interests, it may not deprive those individuals of their
benefits 9 without meeting a certain minimum standard of due process.90 If
80. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (no constitutional right to welfare
benefits); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (no constitutional right to decent housing).
81. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977).
82. 430 U.S. 651 (1971).
83. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 314-21 (institutionalized individuals have a substantive due pro-
cess right to humane medical treatment); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (deliberate indif-
ference to inmate's medical needs was cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the
eighth and fourteenth amendments).
84. Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (1lth Cir. 1987) (en banc) (state created liberty interest
in child when it placed the child in a dangerous foster home); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381
(7th Cir. 1979) (police abandoned child on expressway after arresting the driver of the car).
85. Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972) (no reason in
logic or experience to require physical violence as a prerequisite to § 1983 suit in involuntary
confession case).
86. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
87. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) (federal
courts lack the authority to direct state officials to comply with state law). See also Archie, 847
F.2d at 1215.
88. See Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 108 S. Ct. 1184 (1988) (no entitlement to food
stamps); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 311 (1980) (no entitlement to funding for abortions).
89. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539-41 (1985); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 367-71 (1970).
90. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (burden of proof to terminate parental
rights is the "clear and convincing" standard).
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state law deems these benefits discretionary, however, there is no legitimate
entitlement, and a state need not provide procedural protections. 91
In Mathews v. Eldridge,92 the Court identified four factors to be bal-
anced in determining whether a legitimate deprivation has taken place: (1)
the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation; (3) the
value and burden of additional procedural safeguards; and (4) the nature of
the governmental interest involved.93 Finally, if the state has provided a
sufficient post-deprivation remedy, due process is served by its application
when pre-deprivation procedures are impracticable. 94
C. The Doctrine of Special Relationship
The notion of special relationship evolved as a response to the general
immunity that state actors could claim under the public duty doctrine.
Briefly stated, the public duty doctrine provides that a failure of a public
officer to perform a public duty can constitute an individual wrong only
when a separate and identifiable private duty was owed to the aggrieved
party by the state actor. If no such private duty exists, the injury must be
redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution.95 Many state courts
have adopted some form of special relationship theory.96 Generally, this
theory requires a statutory mandate, coupled with conduct creating reliance
upon government assistance by an individual in a dangerous or disadvanta-
geous situation. Liability may arise when the state delivers such aid with-
out due care.
97
91. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc. v. Perales, 878 F.2d 577, 581 (1989).
92. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
93. Id. at 335.
94. Comment, Taylor v. Ledbetter: Vindicating the Constitutional Rights of Foster Children to
Adequate Care and Protection, 22 GA. L. REV. 1187, 1199-1200 (1988).
95. United States v. Parish of St. Bernard, 756 F.2d 1116, 1126-27 (5th Cir. 1985). See also
Texaus Inv. Corp. v. Haendiges, 761 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1985).
96. Some form of special relationship theory is now accepted by most state courts. See
Shearer v. Town of Gulf Shores, 454 So.2d 978 (Ala. 1984); Williams v. State, 34 Cal. 3d 18, 664
P.2d 137, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1983); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371
So.2d 1010 (Fla. 1979); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979); Fudge v. City of Kansas
City, 239 Kan. 369, 720 P.2d 1093 (1986); Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So.2d 1351 (La. 1980); Irwin
v. Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984); Schear v. Board of County Comm'rs,
101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728 (1984); Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 505 N.E.2d 937,
513 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1987); Bailey v. Town of Forks, 108 Wash. 2d 262, 737 P.2d 1257 (1987).
97. The Minnesota Supreme Court has outlined the following elements to be considered when
determining the existence of a special relationship between the state and a private citizen: (1)
actual knowledge of the dangerous condition; (2) reasonable reliance by the plaintiff on the mumic-
ipality's specific representation and conduct which caused the plaintiff to forego alternative con-
duct for his protection; (3) a statute which creates mandatory acts on the part of the municipality
which are clearly for the protection of a specific class of persons, rather than for the public in
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Relying on language in Martinez v. California,98 various circuit courts
have sought to apply the special relationship doctrine in the context of Sec-
tion 1983 actions. Most of these cases stand for the proposition that if a
state takes a person into custody or otherwise assumes responsibility for
that person's welfare, the fourteenth amendment imposes upon the state a
special duty of care.99 A few cases have strayed outside these parameters,
seeking to impose a more general obligation upon the state to offer protec-
tive services in noncustodial settings.'" 0
III. DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
A. The Majority Decision
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in DeShaney v. Winne-
bago County Department of Social Services,101 noted that petitioner's claim
invoked a substantive due process right to be free from intrusions on per-
sonal security under the fourteenth amendment.'0 2 Rehnquist laid the
groundwork for his analysis by pointing out that the purpose of the due
process clause was to protect individuals from unwarranted governmental
general; and (4) failure of the municipality to use due care to avoid increasing the risk of harm.
Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 806-07 (Minn. 1979).
In a case substantially similar to DeShaney, the New York Court of Appeals, applying similar
factors, imposed liability upon the city for injuries a father inflicted on his infant daughter.
Sorichetti v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d 70, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1985).
98. 444 U.S. 277 (1980) (state would not be liable under fourteenth amendment for murder of
teenager by parolee released five months earlier). The language often quoted as opening the door
to a special relationship doctrine, states that:
[Tihe parole board was not aware that appellants' decedent, as distinguished from the
public at large, faced any special danger. We need not and do not decide that a parole
officer could never be deemed to "deprive" someone of life by action taken in connection
with the release of a prisoner on parole.
Id. at 285 (footnote omitted).
99. Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 720-21 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing Miranda v.
Munoz, 770 F.2d 255 (1st Cir. 1985) (prisoners protected against deliberate indifference to medi-
cal needs); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 709 F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 864 (1983) (agency placed child in foster care); Morrison v. Washington County, 700
F.2d 678 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983) (persons in care of state hospitals)).
100. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't., 855 F.2d 1421, 1426-27 (9th Cir. 1988) (police
failure to respond to continued threats of violence toward estranged wife constituted special rela-
tionship outside of custodial relationship); Estate of Bailey by Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d
503 (3d Cir. 1985) (plaintiffs of decedent child stated a claim against social services agency for
failing to prevent child abuse); Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984) (special relation-
ship existed between caseworkers and child who died from abuse, but immunity protected them);
Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1983) (Section 1983 claim properly dismissed where person
injured by parolee was not in special relationship with the state).
101. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
102. Id. at 194-95 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)).
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intrusions, not to safeguard individuals from interpersonal conflict.10 3 A
state could not be held constitutionally liable for the failure to provide ade-
quate protection to its citizens." 4 Therefore, he concluded, the clause upon
which the petitioner relies confers no affirmative right to aid from the state
in the instance of domestic abuse. 105
Citing the Estelle- Youngberg line of cases,' 6 the Court held that a state
has a duty to assume responsibility for an individual's liberty.'0 7 It is the
state's restraint of personal liberties that triggers due process protection, not
its failure to act to protect those liberties.'0 8 Thus, the lack of an estab-
lished custodial relationship between Joshua and the state at the time he
sustained his injuries served to place him outside the protection offered by
the fourteenth amendment.'I
The majority then considered the actions the state had taken to protect
Joshua. The Court summarily disposed of the notion that the state had a
duty to guarantee Joshua's safety once it had intervened and taken him into
temporary custody. Since the state had returned Joshua to his father's cus-
tody, arguably a position no worse than if it had not acted at all, the govern-
ment could not be constitutionally liable for injuries it did not cause. 10
While the majority noted that the DSS might incur liability under state law
for negligent provision of services, the Court reaffirmed the principle that
the due process clause does not transform every breach of state law into a
constitutional infringement.' 1
In its concluding remarks, the majority reemphasized that, although
sympathetic to Joshua's plight, it could not hold the state responsible for
the infliction of harm by another." 2 It noted the delicate predicament of
social workers who may be held constitutionally liable for breach of the
parent/child relationship." 3 Drawing upon principles of federalism, the
Court concluded that any remedy which Joshua may have must be derived
from state, and not constitutional, tort law.114
103. Id.
104. Id. at 196-97.
105. Id. at 197.
106. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1979); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
107. 489 U.S. 189 at 198-200.
108. Id. at 200.
109. Id. at 201.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 202.
112. Id. at 202-03.
113. Id. at 203.
114. Id. at 202.
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B. The Dissenting Opinions
In the principal dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the majority's focus
on state inaction. Brennan believed the Court predetermined its conclusion
by initially rejecting the contention that the Constitution imposes an affirm-
ative duty on the states to care for their citizens.' 15 While granting the
plausibility of the majority's initial proposition, he argued that it was more
appropriate to examine the actions the state did take, rather than those it
failed to pursue.116
Noting that actual physical restraint is not the only way a state actor
may deprive one of due process," 7 Justice Brennan argued that the state's
knowledge of Joshua's plight, coupled with its expressions of intent to aid
him, amounted to an equally significant limitation on his freedom. I" Since
Joshua was unable to care for himself, the state's monopoly of a particular
type of care will implicate the state even when it is not the principal tort-
feasor. 119
Justice Brennan proceeded to examine the extent to which Wisconsin
had monopolized the caretaker function in cases of child abuse. Although
providing general reporting provisions, the state funnelled all decision-mak-
ing power into the DSS.' 20 As a result, private parties relied on the state to
act; when it did not do so, the dissent reasoned, the state effectively confined
Joshua.' 2 ' Having established significant procedures for preventing child
abuse, the state vested Joshua with a right to their reasonable applica-
tion. 122  Brennan concluded that while negligent conduct cannot violate
due process, the failure to take appropriate action in this case evidenced the
very type of governmental indifference which the Constitution seeks to
prevent. 123
In a separate dissent, Justice Blackmun counselled that the dictates of
fundamental justice compel a compassionate and broad reading of the four-
teenth amendment. 24 Agreeing that the majority's reliance on the action/
115. Id. at 204 (Brennan, J. with Marshall and Blackmun, .L, dissenting).
116. Id. at 204-05.
117. Id. (citing White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979)).
118. Id. at 206.
119. Id. at 206-07.
120. Id. at 208-09.
121. Id. at 210.
122. Id. at 211.
123. Id. at 211-12.
124. Id. at 212-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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inaction distinction was inappropriate, he sadly concluded that overly for-
mal legal reasoning had left Joshua abandoned by all, protected by none.1 25
IV. ANALYSIS
By virtue of our carefully conceived "system of ordered liberty," 126 the
citizenry's right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions is
paramount to an individual's interest in securing the government's protec-
tion, particularly when such protection may require intrusive action. This
is the foundation that supports the Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services.127 Yet the development
of this nation's welfare systems, coupled with the substantial provision of
community services by local governments, challenges the Court's operative
principle. Following a long line of cases, DeShaney failed to take advantage
of the opportunity to clarify the law of constitutional tort, address our soci-
ety's increasing concern for children and the aged, or expand the scope of
the state's role in the provision of social services.
The Court was correct in stating that "nothing in the language of the
Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect... its citizens against
invasion by private actors."1 28 But examining the development of funda-
mental rights theory under substantive due process, and entitlement theory
under procedural due process, the rule behind this assertion becomes less
than an absolute truth. For example, a right to be free from "inactive"
abuse has been established in the custodial setting, 129 and where municipali-
ties have adopted a pattern of activity or policy indicating gross indifference
to an individual recipient's needs.130 Moreover, even after DeShaney, it is
unclear whether substantive due process includes a guarantee of freedom
from arbitrary and capricious state action,13 1 or whether procedural due
process insures a certain standard of conduct when the government under-
takes the provision of substantial community services.13 2
The Court did manage to reenforce a patchwork analysis of governmen-
tal liability, requiring courts to weigh policy against conduct and action
against inaction in custodial versus non-custodial settings, all against a vari-
ety of potentially damning states-of-mind. This confusing approach re-
125. Id.
126. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
127. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
128. Id. at 195 (emphasis added).
129. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
130. Monell v. New York City Dep't. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 670-90 (1978).
131. Weimer v. Amen, 870 F.2d 1400, 1405 (8th Cir. 1989).
132. Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553 (lst Cir. 1989).
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suited in a narrow conclusion in DeShaney and fails to provide lower courts
with any real guidance when confronted by a factually distinct scenario en-
compassing a different level of individual-to-state relation. 133 An illustra-
tion may be found in the foster care setting. The circuits are divided over
whether to impose liability under Section 1983 when child abuse occurs in a
foster home.13 4 Similarly, courts are unclear as to whether a "special rela-
tionship" may provide a constitutionally cognizable basis for liability under
Section 1983.'11
Several commentators have offered methods to clarify these issues.
Professors Wells and Eaton1 36 suggest that substantive due process analysis
is properly applied to constitutional tort claims "because the harm suffered
... may be unconstitutional regardless of whether the appropriate proce-
dures were followed." 1 37 They propose four standards to determine when a
constitutional tort should be available: (1) when the defendant acts with an
impermissible motive or ill-will toward the plaintiff; (2) when an intrusion
on the plaintiff is unreasonably disproportionate to the legitimate goal that
the intrusion serves; (3) when the defendant's recklessness causes injury to a
plaintiff under substantial control by the state; or (4) when a defendant
recklessly harms a plaintiff not under state supervision. 138 An application
of the Wells-Eaton standards would probably reach the same result as the
Court in DeShaney. Their fourth proposition, however, leaves open the
possibility that a state may be liable when it acts recklessly in failing to
provide services to an individual plaintiff.
In this way, if the DSS would have taken one less step and failed to
assign a caseworker to Joshua, it could have been found liable even though
133. DeShaney may be said to stand for the narrow proposition that a municipality which
provides a social service may not be held liable when one of its agents, not evidencing a municipal
policy, fails to take action or acts with gross indifference toward an individual service recipient in
a non-custodial setting who is harmed by a third party.
134. Compare Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dep't of Social Servs., 871 F.2d 474 (4th
Cir. 1989), and Doe v. Bobbitt, 881 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1989), with Lipscomb ex rel. DeFehr, 884
F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1989), and Eugene D. v. Karman, 889 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1989) (decided on
qualified immunity grounds).
135. Compare Edwards v. Johnston County Health Dep't., 885 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1989),
and Piechowicz v. United States, 885 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989), with Cornelius v. Town of High-
land Lake, 880 F.2d 348 (11th Cir. 1989), and Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989).
A recent variant of this problem has arisen with regard to drug-addicted newborns. A "profes-
sional conduct" standard coupled with a "substantial likelihood of harm" test may help to clarify
when the state may intervene as well as the intrusiveness of that intervention. For an innovative
discussion of this issue, see Robin-Vergeer, The Problem of the Drug-Exposed Newborn A Return
to Principled Intervention, 42 STAN. L. REV. 745 (1990) (arguing against automatic removal).
136. See genrally Wells & Eaton, supra note 72.
137. Comment, supra note 94, at 1212 n.131.
138. Wells & Eaton, supra note 72, at 236-37 (quoted in Comment, supra note 94).
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a private actor directly caused his injuries. This result is consistent with
one of the more important purposes of the due process clause: the preven-
tion of arbitrary exercise of government power. It would also have been a
just result, especially since a quasi-state entity had exercised temporary con-
trol over Joshua in the past. If society chooses to allocate resources for a
particular purpose, the Constitution dictates that they be provided to all
who need them in a fundamentally fair manner.
Another commentator 13 suggests that a procedural due process analy-
sis is more appropriate in state "inaction" cases. Under both entitlement
and inaction analyses, the government has withheld the promised benefit
after encouraging reliance upon its provision. 1'4 Indeed, it might even be
argued that Joshua was entitled to protection from child abuse by state
law. 41 The Wisconsin Children's Code phrases the DSS's duty to intervene
in an affirmative, non-discretionary manner. Although Joshua's case was
deliberated at the time he was taken into temporary custody, the DSS has a
duty to investigate each report of abuse and it must offer its services if ap-
propriate. However, the right to petition the court for custody is discretion-
ary, and an entitlement theory may fail here.
Nonetheless, in applying the analogy suggested, it would be fair to con-
clude that Joshua, as a member of a select class, 142 was relying upon the
state's services. The state's failure to adequately protect him may be said to
have deprived Joshua of his "property interest" in that protection. 14 3 How-
139. See Comment, Actionable Inaction: Section 1983 Liability for Failure to Act, 53 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1048, 1063-73 (1986).
140. Id. at 1066.
141. "If the county department determines that a child.., is in need of services, the county
department shall offer to provide appropriate services or to make arrangements for the provision
of services." Wis. STAT. § 48.981(3)(c)3 (1983).
Every state in the United States, the District of Columbia and all United States territories have
child protective service systems. Thompson, Civil Suit: An Abused Child's Only Protection, 6
PROB. L.J. 85, 86 (1984). In all state systems, child abuse reports are followed by investigation by
social workers and intervention, if appropriate.
142. See Palmore v. Sidati, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) ("The State, of course, has a duty of the
highest order to protect the interests of minor children, particularly those of tender years.... The
goal of granting custody based on the best interests of the child is indisputably a substantial gov-
ernmental interest for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 433 (dictum)). See also
Eugene D., supra note 134, at 713-14 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
The Children's Code defines "child" as any person under 18 years of age. Wis. STAT.
§ 48.981(l)(b) (1983). Thus, the class has a different expectation of protection than any other
member of the general public. This classification (coupled with the high state interest evidenced
above) makes it easier to establish the existence of a special relationship between members of the
class and the state. See Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 194-95 n.11 (1984).
143. However, the Constitution establishes only minimum procedures. If state law creates
additional procedural entitlements, these are not themselves property and will not be enforced
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ever, under this analysis, the existence of an appropriate post-deprivation
tort remedy would preclude recovery in federal court. 1"
Finally, although the Court rejected the Youngberg standard as inappro-
priate, the interpretation it was given in Estate of Conners by Meredith v.
O'Connor 4 would have yielded a more profitable analysis. Instead of the
confusing focus on culpability requirements, O'Connor employed a reasona-
bleness test, 14 6 imposing liability only when it could be demonstrated that
defendants did not employ professional judgment. The court explained:
"Under Youngberg's balancing test . . . '[l]iability may be imposed on a
professional state officer only when his or her decision is so objectively un-
reasonable as to demonstrate that he or she actually did not base the chal-
lenged decision upon professional judgment.' "147
In a similar qualified immunity case, Feagley v. Waddill,148 the Fifth
Circuit reasserted this standard of liability while dismissing a state defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment. The Feagley court cited Justice Bren-
nan's dissent in DeShaney 149 for the assertion that mere negligent conduct
is insufficient to state a cause of action, while it sustained a complaint alleg-
ing "a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment" against
an attack on the pleadings.'10
This type of standard is analogous to that employed in determining inef-
fective assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment. 5' As the effective
under the rubric of a substantive constitutional right. Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211,
1217 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 248-51 (1983)).
144. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 538 (1981). See McClary v. O'Hare, 786 F.2d 83, 86 n.3
(2d Cir. 1986) (Parratt post-deprivation ruling limited to procedural due process issues). See also
Weimer, 870 F.2d at 1406 (denying substantive due process claim where state offers adequate
post-deprivation remedies). But see McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 1989)
(equal protection claims based on state inaction not barred by DeShaney because the state may not
selectively deny protective services to certain disfavored minorities).
145. 846 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1988).
146. "[The decision, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be im-
posed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actu-
ally did not base the decision on such a judgment." Id. at 1207 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)).
147. 846 F.2d at 1208.
148. 868 F.2d 1437 (5th Cir. 1989).
149. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 207 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Brennan suggests that "if a State
cuts off private sources of aid and then refuses aid itself, it cannot wash its hands of the harm that
results from its inaction.")
150. Feagley, 868 F.2d at 1441.
151. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ("[W]hether counsel's conduct so
undermined th.e proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial court cannot be relied
on as having produced a just result." Id. at 686). Generally, the plaintiff must show that a differ-
ent outcome would have been obtained but for the attorney's ineffectiveness. Id.
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assistance cases demonstrate, recovery would not be easily gained. While
preserving the integrity of social workers and limiting recovery to only the
most egregious cases, the Court in DeShaney could have returned to its
original holding in Monroe and Parratt 52 and eliminated the state-of-mind
inquiry altogether.
In fact, one commentator has argued that the Court has tentatively
moved from a state-of-mind based approach to a constitutional duty based
approach and, in doing so, has developed a new brand of constitutional-
ism. 15 3 This shift is a healthy one, at long last recognizing the separation of
"duties" from their "rights" counterparts.1 54 As one scholar recently con-
cluded, "[o]nly through a duty theory can the Court coherently distinguish
those losses of life, liberty, or property that are subject to due process con-
straints from those losses that state tort law should remedy."'5 5
This suggestion, the characterization of constitutional duties apart from
constitutional rights, leads us closer to the resolution of the dilemma im-
posed by all such choices: which "fundamental" values should be chosen
over others. The point is that a "choice" need not be made by a constitu-
tional court. Rather, the court need only insure that once a choice by the
legislature or by an executive agency has been made, it is applied in a funda-
mentally fair manner. This is a matter of process, not a matter of substance.
And that is what a claim under the due process clause should be about. The
question becomes not whether Joshua was deprived of his right to life, but
whether it was taken from him by a state actor without due process of law.
Are states constitutionally required to provide social services such as the
ones Joshua received? Arguably they are not. However, it is the province
of the legislature to provide them. Once an extensive system of care is de-
veloped, the state cannot ignore the requests of the underprivileged who
seek its help. If one refuses the care the state provides, the state cannot be
held liable for not providing it. But Joshua had no voice to refuse, and his
parents at least acquiesced to the provision of care. When society enacts
such a legislative measure, it endorses the government to at least preempt,
and possibly occupy the field of, private providers. Once the state is author-
ized to intervene, and such intervention is expected, the services must be
152. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
153. Abernathy, Section 1983 and Constitutional Torts, 77 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1483 (1989) (the
author traces the language and propriety of this movement).
154. See Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 533 (1987).
155. Burnham, Separating Constitutional and Common-Law Torts: A Critique and a Proposed
Constitutional Theory of Duty, 73 MINN. L. REV. 515, 517 (1989) (the author fleshes out a theory
of constitutional duty).
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provided fairly and competently to all if the very intrusive burdens which
the Constitution seeks to shield are to be avoided.
Thus arises the "constitutional duty." Imagine a fire department re-
sponding to a call and attempting to put out the blaze with buckets, or a
police officer collaborating in a robbery, or a judge convicting an accused
without a hearing.'" 6 Are these not all deprivations of due process to some
extent? While the standard we articulate must necessarily be imprecise, the
Constitution guarantees that the state must not act in such a way that,
given the existence of a law establishing systems of service, it deprives the
people of their life, liberty or property, once preservable by other means.
Perhaps the dissenters were correct and the decision in DeShaney was foul,
but in deciding the case on a fundamental rights theme, the majority never
articulated a standard by which we could decide.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's reasoned opinion hedged close to the constitutional line,
recognizing there could be no deprivation of liberty where the state had no
duty to act and inflicted no injury. The case curtailed but did not foreclose
the development of the special relationship doctrine in constitutional tort
law. i"7 Yet it confirmed the conservative direction of the Court by declin-
ing to find any affirmative duty on the part of the state to provide social
services. DeShaney's impact will be felt not so much as a radical turning
from contemporary jurisprudence, but as a bulwark against the further ero-
sion of sovereign immunity in the realm of constitutional tort. Perhaps the
Court will clarify its position on governmental liability under the special
relationship doctrine and articulate a more workable standard for constitu-
tional tort analysis if it grants certiorari in a foster care case. However,
until a clarification is made, plaintiffs will have to continue to rely on the
limits of state tort law to recover for injuries connected with the provision
of government services, for the Court has determined that the Constitution
provides no such remedy.
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156. See, eg., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("Cer-
tainly the fire department must not stand idly by while the church [bums]." Id. at 61.).
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See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200-01 nn.8-9 (1989).
1990]

